Psychology

Humans have two strong and conflicting desires to become more autonomous, and to be connected to other humans. Throughout the lifespan, major developmental tasks revolve around the integration of these two motivations. Empathy is said to be the human capacity to remain autonomous but feel connected to others. It is a complex process involving feeling for another without losing ones sense of self (Stetson, Hurley  Miller, 2003).

The development of empathy and other social-emotional learning has taken on a more important role in education since compelling research emerged that such characteristics are found in people who succeed in their personal and civic lives (Greenberg, Zims, Elias  Weissberg, 2003). Elias and Weisserberg contend that a combination of academic and social-emotional learning must become the true standard for effective education, and this movement towards teaching has led to a variety of universal affective education curricula designed to develop skills necessary to become productive therapists.

Empathy has been variously defined. It has been seen as a skill, as set of strategies (Goldstein  Michaels, 1985), and as an ability (Elliott  Gresham, 1991). However, all contemporary definitions of empathy must include two of the components that will be discussed henceforth the cognitive component and the affective component (Eisenberg, Wentzel  Harris, 1999). To elaborate on it, Eisenberg and Fabes (1990) define empathy as an affective response that arises from the comprehension of anothers emotional state, and that is similar or identical to what the other person feels. Such comprehension for another persons emotional state represents the cognitive aspect of empathy and includes the ability to label feelings, recognize that others may have differing viewpoints, understand that feelings and behavior do not always match, and weigh others feelings and motivations along with ones own. Simply put, The emotional response reflects the affective component, and this includes the ability to respond with similar emotion to the affect displayed by someone who is similar and is close-by, respond to the affect of the group, and respond when the situation that is distant and less familiar (Stetson, Hurley  Miller, 2003).

Richardson, Hammock, Smith, Gardner, and Signo (1994) demonstrated the importance of the cognitive elements of empathy in their three-part study of the relationship between empathy and aggression. Although they measured both affective and cognitive elements of empathy, they found that their cognitive measure, perspective-taking, was inversely related to more forms of aggression than was their affective measure, otherwise called sensitivity or empathic concern. In a follow-up study, they found that participants who had been instructed to engage in perspective-taking administered lower-level shocks to experimental confederates that participants who had not received this training. As a result, it seems as though perspective-taking, conceptualized as cognitive empathy, plays an important role in tempering aggression (Bryant, Roskos-Ewoldsen  Cantor, 2003).

If empathy is simply the ability to accurately identify the feelings of others, however, it is then unclear how it is distinct from other constructs, such as social understanding, social cognition, or affective perspective-taking (Barratt, 1984 Feshbach, 1978 Kurdek  Rogdon, 1975). In fact, a separate school of thought argues that empathy involves more than just recognizing others emotions. It claims that empathy occurs when individuals actually feel the same emotions as other individuals they have observed (Feshbach  Roe, 1968). From this perspective, affective elements are the defining characteristics of empathy (Hoffman, 1975).

Measures that reflect this perspective include the Feshbach and Roes Affective Situation Test for Empathy (FASTE), which involves asking children how they feel after seeing other children display a variety of emotions. Empathy is believed to occur when the respondents self-reported emotion matches the emotion of the child depicted in the observed scenes. Scoring procedures also allow for matching within categories of emotions (Feshbach  Roe, 1968). For example, a child who reports feeling bad in response to seeing a television scene featuring a sad child is still believed to have experienced empathy. If the child reported a hedonically positive emotion, such as happiness, then empathy is not believed to have occurred. This scoring procedure implies that empathy need not involve an exact match in emotions between the observed, so long as the valence of emotions does match (Bryant, Roskos-Ewoldsen  Cantor, 2003).

Mehrabian and Epsteins (1972) emotional empathy scale also illustrates the affective approach to empathy. This measure consists of 33 items tapping a variety of emotional response and tendencies, including susceptibility to emotional contagion, extreme emotional responsiveness, and the tendency to be moved by others positive and negative emotional experiences.

Integrating the cognitive and affective components of empathy, though some researchers emphasize either the cognitive or affective components of empathy, it must be recognized that empathy includes both elements. According to Duan and Hill (1996), the idea that there are separate types of empathy suggests a false dichotomy, when in fact both the cognitive and affective processes are interdependent. However one tries to establish such fact, disagreement will still exist regarding the proper multidimensional conceptualization of empathy and which components are most important. For example, three-dimensional conceptualizations of empathy have been proposed by both Feshbach (1982) and Levy (1997). Although both conceptualizations approach empathy from a perspective that recognizes both cognitive and affective elements, they define the dimensions in unique ways. Davis (1980, cited in Davis, 1983) offered four-dimensional conceptualization of empathy, put into operation in the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). Three of the four components of Davis approach are affective, including fantasy, or the tendency to become emotionally involved with fictional characters. Later, Davis (1983) empirically validated his multidimensional IRI by demonstrating that the four dimensions constituted unique related aspects of ones reactivity to the observed experiences of others (Bryant, Roskos-Ewoldsen  Cantor, 2003).

Davis conceptualization of empathy appears to be popular and is endorsed by other researchers. For example, Dillard and Hunter (1989) suggested that empathy research abandon Mehrabian and Epsteins Emotional Empathy Scale and use the Davis scale instead. Thornton and Thornton (1995) also advocate Davis measure, with some slight modifications. In their factor analysis of both IRI and Eysenck and Eysencks (1978) unidimensional empathy scale, they proposed a five-factor solution that included all of Davis dimensions plus a new facet the authors called emotional response matching. They defined this factor as the sharing of others negative emotions. Thornton and Thorntons analysis makes it clear that the Davis measure, although comprehensive, does not directly address the sharing of emotions between the observer and the observed (Bryant, Roskos-Ewoldsen  Cantor, 2003).

Let us suppose that current thinking on empathy acknowledges that both cognitive and affective skills and tendencies are important aspects of this experience. Although the multidimensional conceptualization is popular, a consensus regarding what the proper multidimensional conceptualization has not yet been reached. There is definitely an overlap among these various approaches, even if the specific labels used are not identical. Given the variety of multidimensional approaches, it can be difficult to synthesize the research that emerges from them. Future research should work towards developing a consensus regarding the most appropriate conceptualization and labels from these components (Bryant, Roskos-Ewoldsen  Cantor, 2003).

Given the unanswered question regarding which component, be it cognitive or affective, affects empathy most, let us try to identify whether empathy is primarily affective or cognitive in quality, given various conditions. Although most researchers agree that empathic responding entails both cognitive and affective components, they differ in their relative emphasis on each. Some (e.g., Hoffman, 1981b Murphy, 1837 and most psychoanalytic writers) emphasize the affective arousal in empathic reactions and place less emphasis on cognitive inferences concerning the other persons emotion. From this perspective, certain forms of empathy could be observed in very young children under certain conditions. Other theorists place greater emphasis on the cognitive components of empathy, usually in terms of an ability to cognitively assume the psychological role of another (e.g, Deutsch  Madle, 1975 Feshbach, 1978 Greenspan et al., 1976). The latter approach is developmentally more demanding and suggests that true empathic responding is unlikely prior to the achievement of a certain criterion of nonegocentric thought. This view, in a way, may limit researchers appreciation of simpler form of vicarious arousal at earlier ages (Eisenberg  Strayer, 1987).

Let us look at the view that an empathic response directly matches the emotion experienced by the other person, or is it merely similar in valence Emphasis on emotional matching (e.g. Feshbach  Roe, 1968) is perhaps theoretically meticulous, but requires a high level of perceptual discrimination and cognitive sophistication that may be beyond the capabilities of most young children. Thus, many children may inappropriately be deemed nonempathic owing to their limited ability to discriminate expressions of more subtle emotions or their inadequate understanding of certain emotional experiences. A definition of empathy that requires an exact match of emotion is also inappropriate for young children because it requires the use of verbal self-report measures in order to assess confidently the veridicality of the observers response. Finally, defining empathy in terms of affective matching seems contrary to the theoretical role of empathy as a motivator of prosocial behavior. Observers who vicariously experience the same emotion as another in distress is immobilizing. Usually, we assume that observers are motivated to help by sharing a more generalized distress reaction. For these reasons, therefore, a definition of empathy that requires an observer to share general emotional tone of another, whether or not there is a direct emotional match, seems appropriate for most purposes (Eisenberg  Strayer, 1987).

Lastly, to which cues concerning anothers experience does an empathic observer respond In daily circumstances, observers can usually draw on multiple cues providing redundant information (Murphy, 1937). Vicarious responding is easier and may be apparent at younger ages when children can observe clear, direct expressions of anothers emotion that are consistent with the persons situation. Once such direct cues are not available or are inconsistent, inferences must be drawn from indirect sources therefore, greater demands will be placed on a childs cognitive and role-taking capabilities and there will be less likelihood of an empathic response. This importance must be stressed upon since many studies of childrens empathy use abstract story narratives, often with dissonant situational and expressive cues, that place greater demands on empathic responding that commonly occur in everyday circumstance. Thus, evidence for empathy may depend on the kind of direct or indirect information that is available concerning anothers emotional experience (Eisenberg  Strayer, 1987).

Taking all these together, such definitional issues concerning the affective and cognitive bases of empathic responding, the veridicality of the observers response, and the kinds of cues to which the person responds are largely concerned with the degree of inference required in an observers empathic response to another. On one hand, children as well as adults experience the direct, almost involuntary pull of anothers emotional expressions in accident settings and other situations eliciting strong affects in others. This kind of emotional contagion requires minimal inference from an observer because these powerful emotional cues reflexively have much greater inferential role taking and, at times, a sophisticated interpretation of anothers affective cues, such as when we interpret socially constrained emotional displays. Such occasions make greater cognitive demands on the potential empathizer, and empathic responding is not necessarily automatic (Eisenberg  Strayer, 1987).

Seemingly, it is appropriate to regard both kinds of empathic responding as anchorpoints on a range of empathy. Such a view affirms the similarity of the empathic experiences of young children and adults when faced with anothers compelling emotional cues. It also fosters developmental study by raising important questions about how the experience of empathy is affected by different situational conditions and the growth of certain age-related abilities. The latter include the development of emotional understanding, the broadening of the childs own background of emotional experiences, and the capacity for self-reflection, and increasing role-taking skills. From this perspective, one can look for evidence of early expressions of empathy in situations involving direct and compelling cues from another, even though young children lack the cognitive skills required for more sophisticated, inferential kinds of empathic responding (Eisenberg  Strayer, 1987).

With the multidimensional conceptualizations of empathy there are, let us now consider the kind of skills required to produce empathic reactions. In order to experience the cognitive aspects of empathy, the ability to engage in perspective-taking is essential (Hoffman, 1975). This requirement should render individuals incapable of experiencing empathy until they develop the ability to see the world from a non-egocentric perspective (Bryant, Roskos-Ewoldsen  Cantor, 2003).

Besides perspective-taking, empathy also requires inference skills. One must understand how another is feeling based on similar experiences that one has encountered in the past. As a result, it may be impossible for an individual to empathize with others if he is not capable of linking his experiences with something he has felt before (Bryant, Roskos-Ewoldsen  Cantor, 2003).

According to Roberts and Strayer (1996), emotional insight is another skill that is required to feel empathy. One must be able to recognize his own emotions before he identifies emotions in others.

Hoffman (1975) also suggested that empathy requires a clear awareness on ones part that others are distinct beings who have unique identities.

Feshbach (1978) explains that some advocates of the empathy as effect position believe that empathic reactions are automatic, primitive, and unlearned. Levy (1997) noted that the original conceptualization of empathy revolved around the idea of motor mimicry. Many of such thinkers believed that innate predispositions lead us to imitate the facial, postural, and gestural expressions of others experience of emotions. By assuming these expressions, we actually come to feel the emotions associated with them.

Lastly, empathic reactions are learned over time through experience and conditioning (Berger, 1962). Experience with the modeled emotions becomes essential to the capacity for empathy.

Personal distress during training
Both the cognitive and affective components are inseparable. Aside from these components, we also have to look at factors that may affect change to ones empathic ability. What happens when one encounters personal distress Often, one reacts emotionally and tries to do something to alleviate this distress. But what does this person exactly feel Are emotions one feels related to what he or she must do to alleviate the distress And if they are, how are they related Eisenberg and her colleagues have clarified sympathy for another who is on distress and feelings of personal distress that are produced by witnessing anothers distress, two outcomes frequently associated with empathy. Sympathy involves ones desire for another to feel better, which is more than just feeling what the other person feels, while personal distress is self-focused (Batson, 1997). The underlying motivation for wanting the other person to feel better is different. In personal distress, a person gets upset as they empathize with anothers distress, but there is still that desire to make the other feel better. These motivations are egoistic, in such a way that the motivation is directed toward the ultimate goal of increasing ones own welfare, and the prosocial behavior stemming from each also differs. Sympathy has this tendency to motivate helping, altruistic behavior, which is directed toward the ultimate goal of increasing the others welfare, even when it comes at some cost to the subject. In contrast, personal distress may lead to prosocial behavior when there is no easier way to reduce ones own discomfort. Through Eisenbergs scheme, the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior depends on whether it leads to sympathy or personal distress (Eisenberg  Fabes, 1990). Basically, if empathy leads to sympathy, the chances of it resulting in prosocial behavior are greater than if it leads to personal distress (Stetson, Hurley  Miller, 2003).

People prone to personal distress tends to be lower in self-regulation of emotions and prone to intense and frequent negative emotions, compared to people prone to sympathetic responding, who tend to be highly regulated yet emotionally intense (Eisenberg, Wentzel  Harris, 1999). The sooner self-regulation and empathy skills are taught, the sooner they become part of a persons repertoire (Shapiro, 1997).

Without a doubt, people often react emotionally to perceived distress of someone else. Furthermore, their emotional reaction is often congruent with what they perceive the others welfare to be. Studies of people witnessing target persons having an undesirable experience in which the stimuli causing the targets experience did not and would not affect the observer, and the abovementioned assertions were based on them. In one of his studies, Berger (1962) had people observe a target person performing a task. He led them to believe that following the onset of a visual signal the target person was either receiving electric shock or not, after which the target person either jerked his or her arm or did not. All the observers were told that they themselves would not be shocked during the study. Berger reasoned that both a painful stimulus in the environment and a distress response were necessary for observers to infer that the target person was experiencing pain. Thus, if observers were responding to the others distress, they should display a physiological reaction to watching the target person only when they inferred that he or she was experiencing pain. Therefore, Berger predicted that participants who perceived both shock and movement would display more physiological arousal that participants from either the painful stimulus or the targets distress response, or both, were missing. Bergers assumption that people can experience emotion as a result from perceiving another in pain, participants in the shock-movement condition were more physiologically aroused while observing the target person than participants in the other three conditions (Eisenber  Strayer, 1987).

It is assumed that the increased arousal of observers in these studies was due not to an emotional reaction to the targets distress but to the observers imagining how they would themselves react once in the situation. If so, then their increased arousal would not really be evidence of one person reacting to anothers distress. Once an emotional response is of low magnitude, the emotion is experienced as sympathy when the emotional response is of high magnitude, the emotion is experienced as personal distress (Eisenber  Strayer, 1987).

Though cognitive and affective components are intertwined, attention must be given to the fact that affective education is a broad term that includes a focus on character education and prosocial skills. Curricula that emphasizes on character education and stresses on key values that encourage students to consider the potential impact of their behavior on the well being of others is strongly advised. The intent is to help students act, think, and feel within the personal moral boundaries that adhere to standards of right and wrong (Isaacs, 2000 Kirschenbaum, 1992). Curricula that emphasizes on prosocial skills would seek to develop processes that contribute to students understanding of emotional and cognitive reactions to situations, evaluations of choices and effective selection of prosocial response. Empathy is to be highlighted in both cases.

IRI scales validity
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index is a measure of dispositional empathy that takes as its starting point the notion that empathy consists of a set of separate but related constructs. The instrument contains four seven-item subscales, each tapping a separate facet of empathy. Items on the fantasy scale measure the tendency to identify with characters in movies, novels, plays and other fictional situations. The other two subscales explicitly tap respondents chronic emotional reactions to the negative experiences of others. The empathic concern scale inquires about respondents feelings of warmth, compassion, and concern for others, while the personal distress scale measures the personal feelings of anxiety and discomfort that result from observing anothers negative experience. The two considerations which guided its development were as follows first, that it be easily administered and scored, and second, that it be designed to capture separately individual variations in cognitive, perspective-taking tendencies of the individual as well as differences in the types of emotional reactions typically experienced (Davis, 1980, 1983).

While the Interpersonal Reactivity Index has high validity numbers stemming from single uses, only few studies have used it over a period of time, and even then, the results were considered insignificant. Therefore, it may be said that its validity in longitudinal studies is null.

Also limiting the validity of the IRI are its small sample sizes, which could lead to a sizeable margin of error (West, Huntington, Huschka, et al., 2007 Bellini  Shoa, 2005 Kinsella, 2006), as well as the varying and possibly vague definitions of empathy from the individuals answering its questionnaire. Empathy may be defined differently by everyone (Gelso  Hayes, 1998 Rosenberger  Hayes, 2002), and thus, the results from the IRI may be considered inaccurate or doubtable. Lastly, the fantasy scale (FS) on the IRI is seldom used in interpersonal research, and it could be argued that the personal distress scale (PD) measures responses to emergency situations rather than actual empathy (Joliffe  Farrington, 2004), e.g., In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease, or Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.

Coonclusion Curriculum that develops empathy
Working on the hypothesis that number of personal therapy hours a clinical psychology graduate student has experienced will be positively correlated with the amount of change in empathic ability, may be supported by the studies conducted by Goldstein.

Students must recognize that participating in a number of personal therapy hours give them an opportunity to observe how professionals conduct therapy hours.  By observation, they are not only given an avenue to enhance and exercise their empathic abilities, they are also basically being given an idea on the various dos and don during the possible therapy hours they may conduct in the future, and a general perspective on how a therapist must act accordingly with a client. To become a good and empathic observer, the student must learn how to shift his or her attention from the subjective to the objective, from him or herself to the other person, the therapist he or she is currently with. One must learn how to make observations and bring about guided and critical inferences. A student should not merely see or hear the other person the student must perceive a quality in the person and familiarize him or herself with this process of creation of perception (Goldstein, 1999).

In trying to develop empathy, or upon enhancing it, the student must put him or herself inside the skin of the person being observed and be able to share the world that he or she sees and feels. A high level of empathic understanding is reached when the student is able to put together what has been said and the manner in which it has been said, in a way that goes beyond the words used. In the future, the student may be able to articulate such views and feelings in a way that he or she expresses them even more accurately and fully (Goldstein).

The next hypothesis that a great number of face-to-face client-patient therapy practicum hours that clinical psychology graduate student has accrued will also be positively correlated to the amount of change in empathic ability may be strengthened by the following studies.

Goldstein (1999) described empathy as a four-phase process in his studies. The first phase is identification, which partly through an instinctive, imitative activity and partly through a relaxation of ones conscious controls, students allow themselves to become absorbed in contemplating the another person and their experiences. The second phase is that of incorporation, which is the act of taking the experience of the others into the students themselves. It is hard to distinguish this phase from the initial act of feeling oneself into another person, but these are two side of the process. Once a student is able to identify, he or she must project himself or herself into the other once a student is able to incorporate, he or she introjects the other person into himself or herself. The third phase is called reverberation, wherein what students has taken into themselves now echoes upon some part of the students own experience and awakens a new appreciation. The student allows for interplay between two sets of experiences, the internalized feelings of others and their own experience and fantasy. The last phase is called detachment. This phase of empathic understanding allows students to withdraw from their subjective involvement and use the methods of reason and scrutiny. They must break their identification and deliberately move away to gain the social and psychic distance necessary for objective analysis.

Students constant exposure to personal therapy hours would allow for the development and enhancement of their empathic ability. Also, continuous contact with clients or patients would allow for them to undergo the abovementioned phases wherein they could familiarize themselves with the phases and how they must be executed.

The author works on the assertion that the hypothesis is further developed by the following information gathered from Goldsteins studies Basically, the first phase of the empathic process begins as an observer perceives the feeling state and thoughts of another by means of overt behavioral cues displayed by the other. In the second phase, the observers perceptions are taken in and generate both cognitive and affective responses within. In this phase, the observer seeks to avoid stereotyping, value judgments, the formulation of hypotheses, or other forms of cognitive analysis. Instead, the student, as an observer, must seek to hold such cognitive processes in abeyance while allowing and encouraging a largely unfettered, as-if experiencing the clients affective world. Next, the detachment and decoding phase of cognitive analysis allows an observer to seek to distinguish among, sort out, and label his or her own feelings and, via a cognitive, role-taking effort, those perceived as being experienced by the client. Lastly, the observer must communicate accurate feedback to the client regarding the clients emotions and cognitions (Goldstein, 1999).

It is lastly hypothesized that the greater number of personal therapy hours a clinical psychology graduate student has will interact with the greater number of face-to-face clientpatient therapy practicum hours following six months of therapy practicum experience, predicting the highest increase in empathic ability, and that this is stalwartly supported by the studies that Goldstein conducted, and that the hypothesis is strongly related with the numerous exposures a student has with the observations made and the exposure to the four empathic behaviors or phases undergone through  personal therapy hours and face-to-face clientpatient therapy practicum hours.

It is therefore summarized that perceiving the clients gestalt, allowing a direct feeling response to arise, holding qualifying or distorting cognitive processes in abeyance, and separating his own feelings from those shared with the client, all characterize the observers receptivity to the client. It must be kept in mind that accurate reception must be complemented by accurate feedback (Goldstein, 1999).

Thus far, empathy has now been described and defined as a process composed of four sequentially related components. There are still concepts to be clarified, but enough appears understood about what empathy is, how it functions, what its varying and interdependent components are, what external factors or cues may affect change on it, how distress may affect it, and how the hypothesis is strengthened by the rationale behind the curriculum.